Abstract-Numerous methods for detecting audio splicing have been proposed. Environmental-signature-based methods are considered to be the most effective forgery detection methods. The performance of existing audio forensic analysis methods is generally measured in the absence of any anti-forensic attack. Effectiveness of these methods in the presence of anti-forensic attacks is therefore unknown. In this paper, we propose an effective anti-forensic attack for environmental-signature-based splicing detection method and countermeasures to detect the presence of the anti-forensic attack. For anti-forensic attack, dereverberation-based processing is proposed. Three dereverberation methods are considered to tamper with the acoustic environment signature. Experimental results indicate that the proposed dereverberation-based anti-forensic attack significantly degrades the performance of the selected splicing detection method. The proposed countermeasures exploit artifacts introduced by the anti-forensic processing. To detect the presence of potential anti-forensic processing, a machine learning-based framework is proposed. In particular, the proposed anti-forensic detection method uses a rich-feature model consisting of Fourier coefficients, spectral properties, high-order statistics of musical noise residuals, and modulation spectral coefficients to capture traces of dereverberation attacks. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated on both synthetic data and realworld speech recordings. The experimental results show that the proposed rich-feature model can detect the presence of antiforensic processing with an average accuracy of 95%.
availability of many digital data manipulation software packages, Internet users are increasingly vulnerable to malicious forgeries. Powerful, inexpensive, and easy-to-use digital media manipulation tools (such as CoolEditor and Audacity, among others) can be used to achieve a wide range of manipulations, including splicing, deletion and tampering with the recording time signature. Splicing operation refers to cutting a segment from one audio file and inserting it into another; whereas, deletion operation consists of removing a specific part of the recording to conceal the identity of the speaker; and tampering with the recording time signature requires a modification of the electric network frequency (ENF).
Audio splicing is one of the most popular and easiest attacks; in such an attack, target audio is assembled by splicing segments from multiple audio recordings. The splicing technique can be used to manipulate the voice of speakers or crime scene events in evidentiary audio. The increasing use of digital recordings as evidence in every sector of litigation and criminal justice proceedings demonstrates that there is an urgent need for integrity verification of digital audio recordings, which justifies further research in the areas of integrity authentication and tamper detection and localization.
A. Related Works
Over the past decade, various audio forensic methods have been proposed for authenticating the integrity of audio/speech recordings. These methods include post-processing detection, tamper detection, and tamper localization [1] . Existing audio forensic methods [2] - [16] can be classified into the following three main categories: 1) ENF-based methods [2] - [4] : The ENF-based forensic analysis method is one of the most reliable integrity verification methods. This method extracts the ENF signature from the evidentiary recording and compares it with a reference ENF database for verification and tamper detection [5] , [6] . 2) Post-processing distortion-based methods [7] , [8] , [10] :
These methods exploit the traces of double compression left by manipulations. They generally utilize the statistical properties of modified discrete cosine transform coefficients or Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) to identify the presence of double compression [9] - [11] . 3) Acoustic environment-based methods [12] - [16] : These methods exploit the inconsistency in the acoustic 1556-6013 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
environmental signature extracted from the evidentiary recording for forensic applications such as recording location identification and splice detection. Recently, Malik and Farid [12] and Malik [16] proposed the use of reverberation parameters for environment identification and its application to audio forensics. However, the results of this scheme have large discrepancies from reality due to its over-simplified assumption regarding the room impulse response (RIR) model. Similarly, Moore et al. [17] utilized the early decay time and reverberation time (T 60 ) as roomprints for forensic audio applications. High accuracy (∼ 96%) was achieved only if a clean RIR was provided. However, a clean RIR model is not always available in practice. Moreover, Peters et al. [18] proposed a room classification method with underlying acoustic features (i.e., MFCCs) and a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) classification with average detection errors as high as 39% for musical signals and 15% for speech signals. In [19] , the autocorrelation function features from the Gammatone filterbank response were used. Recently, Malik and Zhao [13] and Zhao and Malik [14] , [15] extended the scheme in [12] by taking advantage of highorder statistics (referred to as an environmental signature) extracted from the reverberation and background noise for environment identification. In this scheme [12] , classification performance has been verified in various experimental settings (e.g., different microphone types and recording locations). Malik and Zhao [13] and Zhao and Malik [14] , [15] extended environmental-signature-based audio forensics for applications in audio splicing detection and localization. The performance of these methods [20] , [21] was evaluated using both synthetic speech and real-world data. In general, these methods yield better performance for splicing detection than existing methods [22] , [23] .
All of the above forensic methods [12] - [21] assume that tampered audio is generated by simply splicing segments from multiple sources and that the temporal trace of background acoustic distortion can be estimated from the evidentiary recording. Inconsistency in the estimated background acoustic distortion is used for detecting forgeries. The performance of these schemes against anti-forensic attacks has not yet been evaluated. More specifically, "it is unclear whether these schemes would be equally robust if the acoustic environment signature is tampered with." For example, a determined attacker may devise an effective attack strategy for bypassing current forensic methods. We refer to these techniques as antiforensic techniques, which aim to conceal the manipulation distortion.
Over the past few years, image forensics has witnessed considerable advancements in anti-forensics and its countermeasures. For instance, Valenzise et al. [24] revealed the traces of JPEG compression and proposed an anti-forensic method for eliminating these traces. Similarly, Wu et al. [25] proposed an anti-forensic method based on median filtering by adding artificial noise. However, the anti-forensic framework and its countermeasures for audio forensics remain relatively less developed. Chuang et al. [26] , [27] proposed the first antiforensic scheme and its countermeasures for ENF-based audio authentication. Chuang et al. proposed various anti-forensic operations for tampering with the underlying ENF signal while preserving the quality of the host signal. The scheme proposed in [26] and [27] is specifically designed for ENF-based audio authentication. Therefore, it cannot be applied in other audio forensic methods, such as environmental-signaturebased audio splicing detection.
The environmental-signature-based forensic method was first proposed in 2010 and is thus a relatively new method. It enables the authentication performance to be improved using the environmental signature and the potential countermeasures to be investigated under the situation of an anti-forensic attack. Moreover, the environmental-signature-based methods are robust against compression attacks and do not require a reference database for forgery detection. The performance of the environmental-signature-based approach has been extensively evaluated in the absence of any anti-forensic attack. Therefore, its robustness against expert attacks is unknown. Research on anti-forensics and its countermeasures can be used to (i) redefine the performance of the authentication method under anti-forensic attacks, (ii) highlight its limitations under anti-forensic attacks, and (iii) develop countermeasures for the detection of anti-forensic processing and for robust and reliable authentication. Moreover, the research on the environmental-signature-based splicing detection method, in the presence of anti-forensic attacks, complements ENF-based methods and serves as a stepping stone for the development of a reliable and robust framework for audio forensic analysis.
B. Our Contributions
This paper investigates the anti-forensic technique against the environmental-signature-based audio splicing detection method proposed in [20] and [21] and proposes a framework for anti-forensic attack detection. Specifically, a rich-feature model is proposed to capture traces of anti-forensic processing. The proposed rich model includes short time Fourier transform (STFT) coefficients, spectral properties, high-order statistics of "musical noise" residuals, and perceptual relevant features (e.g., modulation spectral coefficients). A supervised machine learning is used to learn the underlying model for anti-forensic processing detection. To address potential overfitting issues associated with the high-dimensional feature space, effect of both linear-and nonlinear-based dimensionality reduction methods on the performance is also evaluated. The detection performance of the individual feature sets and of the entire feature set is analyzed. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated on both synthetic reverberant speech and real-world speech recordings. Experimental results suggest that (i) the proposed anti-forensic attack method can be used to elude splicing detection by the audio splicing detection method [20] , [21] ; (ii) the proposed rich-feature model combined with the supervised learning technique can detect the presence of anti-forensic processing with high accuracy; (iii) the nonlinear dimensionality reduction method outperforms the linear method; (iv) the proposed scheme has similar performance for both the source-matched case, in which the dereverberation methods used in training and testing are perfectly matched, and the source-mismatched case, in which the dereverberation methods used in training and testing are different; and (v) the proposed scheme is robust against moderate noise, median filtering and mean filtering.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the splicing detection method, and Section III outlines the details of the anti-forensic operations for the environmental-signature-based splicing detector. Countermeasures against anti-forensic attacks are proposed in Section IV. The experimental setup and results based on synthetic data and real-world speech recordings are presented in Section V. Finally, conclusions and future directions are discussed in Section VI.
II. REVIEW OF THE AUDIO SPLICING DETECTION METHOD
In [20] and [21] Zhao et al. proposed to use the environmental signature (based on the RIR and background noise) to detect the presence of splicing and localize tampering in the queried audio signal. Experimental results demonstrated that the performance of these methods is superior compared to that of other related works when the frame duration is longer than 1.5s. For the sake of completion, a brief overview of this splicing detection method is provided as follows:
1) Divide the input audio into frames of length L with 50% overlapping. 2) Estimate the environmental signatureĤ i from the i th frame. 3) Use first M frames as a reference and calculate the correlation coefficients ρ i with the following averaging,
where N CC(a, b) represents the normalized correlation coefficient between a and b. 4) Detect the suspected frame using the raw detection method, and set the label p i of the i th frame as follows,
where T is the decision threshold. 5) Refine the results using the neighborhood similarity score as follows,
where W and R s represent the window size (e.g., W = 3 or 5) and similarity score threshold (e.g., R s ∈ [0.7, 0.9]), respectively. q i = 1 indicates that the i th frame is detected as spliced.
III. ANTI-FORENSIC SCHEME
In this section, anti-forensic techniques against the environmental-signature-based audio splicing detection are proposed. The objective of anti-forensic attacks is to conceal Fig. 1 .
Flowchart of the anti-forensic technique against environmental signature-based audio splicing detection.
the trace of malicious manipulations while preserving the quality of the audio content. An attacker can alter the underlying signature to be used for integrity verification. The anti-forensic attack can be treated as a post-processing step that is likely to leave traces in the resulting audio. Therefore, any artificial degradation of the quality in evidentiary recordings can be used for anti-forensic detection.
We have shown in [20] and [21] that the inconsistency in the estimated environmental signatures can be used to identify the traces of splicing. What if an attacker chooses to develop a strategy that removes the underlying environmental signature from the evidentiary recording and injects the desired environmental signature? For example, consider the case in which an anti-forensic attack aims to eliminate splicing inconsistency via the following steps: 1) Remove the environmental signature from the audio/speech signals, 2) Carefully splice these signals together to avoid any discontinuity of the speech content (i.e., the resulting signal should be realistic for listening), 3) Generate a desired environmental signature and add it on the spliced signal. Fig. 1 is the flowchart of the proposed antiforensic procedure. The core of the framework shown in Fig. 1 is that the proposed anti-forensic method is achieved using dereverberation operation, which is a commonly used for speech enhancement applications [28] , [29] . Existing dereverberation methods can be classified into two main categories: (i) non-blind dereverberation methods [30] , which exploit knowledge of the underlying RIR, and (ii) blind dereverberation methods [31] , which do not have any prior knowledge of the underlying RIR. It is reasonable to assume that the attacker does not have a prior knowledge of the acoustic environment where the recording is made. For this attack model, blind dereverberation-based attack is considered here. Any existing blind dereverberation method can be used to remove the underlying environmental signature. It has been observed through extensive investigation that effectiveness of the propose anti-forensic attack depends on the effectiveness of the dereverberation operation. Following three blind dereverberation algorithms are considered here to illustrate effectiveness of the proposed attack model:
Shown in
• Spectrum classification and inverse filtering (SCIF) [31] :
The algorithm employs RASTA-filtered MFCC as a feature set to train a GMM-based classifier. The channel response is estimated using a spectrum classification method and used for dereverberation via inverse filtering.
• Gammatone spectral domain filtering and non-negative matrix factorization (GSF-NMF) [32] : This method models the reverberation as a convolution of a clean speech and a RIR. The non-negativity and sparsity of the speech spectra are then used to estimate the clean spectra under the least-squares error criterion.
• Two-stage spectral subtraction (TSSS) [33] : This is a two-stage process. In the first stage, an inverse filter is estimated to reduce the coloration effect such that the signal-to-reverberant energy ratio is increased. Then, spectral subtraction is employed to minimize the influence of long-term reverberation. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed anti-forensic attack, a forged audio is assembled from two speech recordings randomly selected from TIMIT [34] . The resulting forged recording is subjected to anti-forensic attacks based on SCIF, GSF-NMF, and TSSS. All four recordings (one forged and three anti-forensic processed) are then analyzed using the splicing detection method (described in Section II). Shown in Fig. 2 is the output of the splicing detection method for all four recordings. Here, frames marked with blue circles and red triangles belong to two different environments. If the coefficients of all of the frames are at a similar level, then the signal is authentic; otherwise, it is subjected to splicing manipulation. It can be observed from Fig. 2 (a) that the splicing detection method has a very high probability of identifying and localizing the spliced frames for the forged audio. In the presence of anti-forensic processing, however, the detection performance degrades significantly (see Figs the most effective method among all three methods. This is because the implementation of the splicing detection method described in Section II also uses the SCIF algorithm to extract the environmental signature. In other words, if the attacher has complete knowledge of the forensic analysis technique used by the forensic investigator, the attacker can use an antiforensic attack to successfully evade the detection process. The effectiveness of the countermeasures, which will be discussed in Section IV, is evaluated for all three anti-forensic attacks, i.e., SCIF, GSF-NMF and TSSS.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES OF ANTI-FORENSICS
It can be observed from Fig. 2 that anti-forensic methods can be used to successfully conceal the presence of splicing. Therefore, forensic investigators need to devise countermeasures for detecting traces of anti-forensic processing. Consider the proposed dereverberation-based anti-forensic attack, the primary objective of dereverberation is to improve the robustness of speech recognition or speaker recognition against acoustic distortion rather than improving the speech quality/intelligibility or listening experience. It was shown in [35] that many reported dereverberation methods introduce nonlinear distortion that slightly degrades speech quality. Nonlinear distortion due to dereverberation processing may be perceptible, particularly during silent regions. We propose to exploit the nonlinear distortion in the queried recording to detect the presence of dereverberation processing. More specifically, we propose using traces of dereverberation processing to detect anti-forensic attacks. For this purpose, the perceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ) [36] ) measure can be used to determine the presence of anti-forensic attacks for cases in which the reference signal is available. However, the reference signal is generally not available in practice. Hence, a statistical machine learning-based classification framework based on a rich model is proposed to learn the characteristics of distortions due to anti-forensic processing. The proposed anti-forensic detection framework is shown in Fig. 3 .
A. Rich-Feature Model-Based Classification
A single feature is barely sufficient for capturing the various distortions derived from malicious manipulations. Hence, a feature vector of large dimension is considered. For feature extraction, therefore, a rich model consisting of comprehensive features derived from the signal spectrum domain and modulation spectrum domain is proposed. The elaboration of the rich model is given as follows.
1) Spectral Coefficients in the STFT Domain:
The main motivation for using STFT coefficients is that the STFT domain is the primary choice for many dereverberation methods because the Fourier transform operator converts convolution distortion in the time domain into multiplicative distortion in the frequency domain [32] , [33] . Furthermore, some dereverberation methods [37] , [38] estimate reverberation in the Log-STFT domain by applying the log operator to the Fourier coefficients. Therefore, the distortion introduced by dereverberation is directly superimposed to the spectral coefficients or the log-spectral coefficients. Let x(t) be the time domain representation of the audio/speech signal; X (k, n) be the spectral coefficients in the STFT domain, where k (1 ≤ k ≤ K) is the index of the frequency bins; and n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) be the index of the frames. The feature vector f LS consists of the averaged log-spectral coefficients over frames and is given as follows.
2) Spectral Shape Features: Spectral shape features characterize the spectral properties, including the centroid, spread, slope, and crest factor. These features are extracted from the magnitude of the spectral coefficients. These spectral properties have shown their effectiveness for many applications, including event detection, music retrieval, and sound classification [39] . A brief description of the spectral features used is provided next.
• Spectral Centroid: The center of gravity of the spectral energy.
• Spectral Spread: The concentration of the power spectrum around the spectral centroid.
• Spectral Decrease: The steepness of the decrease of the spectral envelope over the frequency.
• Spectral Slope: The slope of the spectral shape.
• Spectral Crest Factor: The tonalness of the audio signal.
• Spectral Flatness: How noise like a signal is.
• Spectral Tonal Power Ratio: The tonalness of a signal.
where E T (n) is the tonal power.
• Spectral Flux: The amount of change in the spectral shape.
• Spectral Rolloff: The bandwidth of the analyzed frame.
where κ is set to 0.85 or 0.95. • Spectral Skewness: The asymmetry of the distribution of spectral coefficients.
where μ and σ represent the mean and standard deviation of X (·, n), respectively, and E is the expectation operator.
• Spectral Kurtosis: Measures the peakedness of the distribution of spectral coefficients.
• Spectral Entropy: The disorderliness of the spectral coefficients.
We anticipate that distortions due to dereverberation processing can be captured through spectral features described in (5) ∼ (16). We refer to these features as spectral shape and distribution features, which are denoted by a vector f SSD . 3) Modulation Spectral Features: As mentioned above, dereverberation processing may degrade the perceptual quality of the input signal. The extent of degradation depends on how strongly the dereverberation method is applied. To capture traces of dereverberation processing, a perceptually relevant feature set called modulation spectral coefficients [40] is considered here. The details of modulation spectral coefficients extraction are as follows.
(i) Gammatone filterbank analysis:
The speech signal x(t) is filtered by a bank of 24 criticalband gammatone filters to emulate the processing of the cochlea. The resulting output of the i th gammatone filter is given as,
where h i (t) is the impulse response of the i th filter [41] . The center frequencies of the gammatone filters range from 125 Hz to nearly half of the sample rate. Shown in Fig. 4 are plots of the magnitude gains of 24-channel gammatone filterbank. (ii) Envelope detection:
After filterbank analysis, the envelope, e i (t), of each channel output x i (t) is detected using the Hilbert transform H(·) as,
(iii) Windowing and FFT: The temporal envelope e i (t) of each channel is multiplied by a 256 ms Hamming window with a 32 ms overlap. Then, the modulation spectrum for the i th critical band is obtained by applying FFT (denoted as F (·)) to e i (t);
where k and n represent the indices of the frequency bin and frame, respectively. (iv) Mel-filterbank mapping:
For each frame, the dimension of the modulation spectral coefficients is up to 24 × k (e.g., k = 512). It is computationally expensive to use them directly for training. Moreover, the classifier is prone to overfitting. To reduce the feature dimension, we apply Mel-filterbank mapping [42] to the spectral coefficients of each frame. The rationale of this approach is to make the extracted features match more closely with what a human hears. The mapping can be obtained as follows,
where m is the index of the Mel-filterbank bins (e.g.,
is the modulation spectral coefficient at the m th frequency bin and the n th frame of the i th channel. We refer to ξ i as perceptually relevant modulation spectral features denoted by a vector f PRMS in the remainder of this paper. Shown in Fig. 5 is the block diagram of the modulation spectral feature extraction from an input audio signal x(t).
4) Noise Residual Features:
The spectral features in the STFT domain and the modulation spectrum features can be used to capture the traces of spectral and perceptual distortion introduced by dereverberation processing. However, these distortions cannot be uniquely linked to dereverberation processing. For example, other non-malicious signal processing operations, such as signal enhancement, denoising, and downsampling, may also cause such distortions. To differentiate between dereverberation processing and non-malicious signal processing operations, we propose to consider distortions that are uniquely attributed to dereverberation processing.
Generally, dereverberation methods start by estimating the RIR or spectrum of reverberation, followed by subtracting it from the reverberant signal. Due to the inaccurate estimation of the RIR or reverberation, the subtraction may lead to undesired results (e.g., negative values). To overcome this problem, a commonly accepted solution is to apply a nonlinear truncation to the signal after spectrum subtraction, which results in a specific residual noise, often referred to as an "artificial noise" or "musical noise", to account for its perceptual characteristics [35] . Temporal discontinuities, window-FFT analysis and synthesis mismatch, and unbalanced spectral modification are other major sources of musical noise [43] .
To illustrate the musical noise phenomenon, the spectrogram of an audio signal processed using the TSSS-based dereverberation method is shown in Fig. 6 . The following observations can be made from Fig. 6 :
• The musical noise in the median/high frequencies is more pronounced (visible) than that in the low frequency.
• The musical noise appears as isolated points in the spectrogram. It can also be observed from Fig. 6 that the isolated musical noise is analogous to the "salt-and-pepper" noise in images. To track the musical noise from the input audio signal, the spectrogram of the queried audio signal is computed. This spectrogram can be treated as a 2D spatial imageX (k, n) . The features are extracted as follows.
(i) High-pass filtering: Because the musical noise occurs in the mid and high frequency bins, therefore, removing the low frequency coefficients is expected to improve the robustness of the extracted features. The filter output is expressed as,
where Filter HP represents the high-pass filtering operator. (ii) Musical noise extraction:
The second step is to extract the musical noise from the spectrogram. To achieve this goal, an image denoising method is applied to obtain a clean version of the spectrogram. Then, the musical noise residual r (k, n) can be extracted by subtracting the denoised spectrogram fromX H P (k, n) as,
where Denoise(·) represents the denoising operator. In this paper, the BM3D approach is employed due to its superior performance in image denoising applications [44] . (iii) Feature extraction:
Rather than using r (k, n) as the features, the following normalized central moments are extracted,
where d = 1, . . . , 10 are the orders. We call these features central moments of the musical noise residual and denote them as f CM .
B. Temporal Integration of Features
All of the feature vectors, except for f LS and f CM , are extracted on a frame-by-frame basis. Consequently, the feature dimension depends on the total length of each audio. To avoid feature dimension mismatch, we propose to use 
,var (27) 
where represents the name of the features in (5)- (16) . The mean value integration operator is also applied to the modulation spectral feature vector f PRMS .
C. Feature Dimensionality Reduction
Shown in Table I is the dimension of each feature vector after temporal integration. As shown in Table I , the feature dimension of all feature sets is up to 1035 (for K = 512), which is still quite large.
In machine learning and statistics, dimensionality reduction (DR) is a process of reducing the number of features by transforming the feature vector in the high-dimensional space to a lower-dimensional space. Numerous DR methods have been proposed, which can be classify into linear and nonlinear DR approaches. The linear DR schemes include principal component analysis, linear discriminant analysis, locality preserving projections (LPP), and multidimensional scaling, and so on; whereas, the nonlinear DR schemes include isomap, locally linear embedding, and Laplacian eigenmaps [45] . Following approaches are used for dimensionality reduction:
• Locality preserving projections (LPP) [46] , which are linear projective mappings that optimally preserve the neighborhood structure of the feature set. It is an alternative to principal component analysis (PCA) due to its superior performance.
• Laplacian eigenmaps [47] , which use spectral techniques to perform dimensionality reduction. This technique relies on the basic assumption that the feature lies in a lowdimensional manifold in a high-dimensional space. The algorithm provides a computationally efficient approach for non-linear dimensionality reduction that also has locality preserving properties and a natural connection to clustering. In general, nonlinear methods perform better than linear methods do, though at the expense of a higher computational cost. Our experimental results in this paper also reinforce this claim.
D. Summary of the Proposed Anti-Forensic Detection
For each audio recording, a feature vector is extracted, integrated, and projected into the lower dimension. After the feature vectors are processed using DR methods, a classifier such as support vector machine (SVM) is trained. A trained classifier is then used to evaluate classification performance on a test dataset. The proposed machine learning process consists of two stages, that is, the training phase and detection phase.
Training Phase: 1) Given the training dataset, the feature vector f * of each recording, with * representing one of the features listed in Table I , is extracted using the methods described in Section IV-A. 2) The feature vector f * is processed using the temporal integration method (see Section IV-B), followed by dimensionality reduction on all of the features (see Section IV-C). 3) Feeding the final feature vector f of each recording into the SVM to learn the underlying model M, which consists of an optimal hyperplane C [48] . Detection Phase: 1) Given the suspected forgery in the evidential recording signal y, the features are extracted (from the test dataset) using the methods in Section IV-A, followed by feature integration (see Section IV-B) and dimensionality reduction (see Section IV-C).
2) The resulting feature vector f y is then fed into model M and compared with C. If f y belongs to the positive side of C, then the recording is classified as an anti-forensic recording. Otherwise, it is classified as an authentic recording.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance degradation of the splicing detection method discussed in Section II under the antiforensic attacks is first analyzed. The effectiveness of the proposed anti-forensic detection using (i) the PESQ measure and (ii) rich model-and SVM-based classification system is evaluated on both synthetic data and real-world speech recordings.
A. Datasets and Experimental Setup
Two datasets, one synthetic and one real-world dataset, are used for the performance evaluation of the proposed framework. The speech dataset of the TIMIT corpus [34] is used to generate the synthetic dataset. The TIMIT dataset contains broadband recordings (with a sampling frequency f s = 16 kHz) of 630 speakers (438 male and 192 female).
In the recording, each speaker utters 10 sentences. Each utterance is approximately 3 seconds long. The synthetic room response generated by the source-image method [49] for a rectangular room is convolved with the speech to obtain the reverberant signal, followed by adding artificial Gaussian noise. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) value of noise addition was set to 30 dB, which is also the default value in the simulation studies.
Similarly, a real-world dataset [15] , [16] that consists of more than 1000 speech recordings is used. These speech recordings were recorded using four different types of commercial-grade external microphones in various environments, such as outdoors, small offices (predominantly furnished with carpet and drywall), stairs (predominantly ceramic tiles and concrete walls), and restrooms (predominantly furnished with ceramic tiles). In each recording environment, the content was either read by a human or played back using a loud speaker. The audio was originally recorded with a 44.1 kHz sampling frequency and 16 bits/sample resolution and then downsampled to 16 kHz. Each recording is with a length of 7 s∼9 s.
For generation of the forged dataset, two reverberant signals, either artificially introduced or recorded directly, are randomly selected and spliced by simply assembling them together in time domain. Furthermore, to avoid any perceptible distortion, the splicing location in the silent region of the recording is selected.
For the classification, a binary support vector machine (SVM) [48] with a radial basis kernel function is used due to its superior performance. For each experiment, the optimal parameters for the classifier are determined using a grid-search technique with five-fold cross-validation on the training data. The kernel parameters C (penalty parameter) and γ (kernel parameter of the radial basis function) were selected from the multiplicative grid
In each experiment, half of the speech recordings are randomly selected for training, and the remainder are used for testing. Each experiment is repeated 10 times, and the classification accuracy is averaged over all runs.
The performance of the proposed detection scheme is evaluated in terms of the true positive rate (TPR, the probability of the anti-forensic speech being correctly identified), false positive rate (FPR, the probability of the original reverberant speech being incorrectly classified as anti-forensic speech), true negative rate (TNR, the probability of the original reverberant speech being correctly identified), false negative rate (FNR, the probability of the anti-forensic speech being incorrectly classified as original speech) and accuracy (Acc), defined as the average value of T P R τ and T N R τ with the optimal decision threshold τ :
B. Performance of Splicing Detection With Anti-Forensic Attacks
The preliminary results presented in Section III indicate that the three proposed anti-forensic techniques can potentially bypass the splicing detection method proposed in [20] and [21] . Further details regarding the performance evaluation under the selected anti-forensic processing are provided here. To this end, the splicing detection performance of the method proposed in [20] and [21] in the presence/absence of anti-forensic attacks is evaluated on the synthetic dataset. Shown in Fig. 7 are the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves for the forged dataset subjected to anti-forensic processings using SCIF, GSM-NMF and TSSS. As shown in Fig. 7 , in the absence of anti-forensic attacks, the selected splicing detection method achieves very high accuracy (≈ 96.99%). However, in the presence of anti-forensic attacks, the accuracy decreases to 60.43%, 88.16%, and 58.77% for SCIF, GSM-NMF and TSSS, respectively. Moreover, Fig. 7 shows that the detection performance for GSM-NMF-based dereverberation is approximately 88%, which makes it an unattractive choice for anti-forensic purpose. However, SCIF-and TSSS-based dereverberation methods significantly degrade the detection performance.
C. PESQ Evaluation
In our second experiment, PESQ scores are used to evaluate audio quality degradation due to anti-forensic processing based on the selected dereverberation methods, including SCIF, GSF-NMF and TSSS. Specifically, the mean opinion score (MOS) metric is used to determine the level of the musical noise [43] introduced by dereverberations. The MOS scale is shown in Table II . To achieve this goal, the synthetic forged dataset is processed using the selected dereverberation schemes with the default parameter settings recommended in [31] - [33] . For each test signal (processed using the dereverberation method), the PESQ score (in terms of MOS) is calculated using the corresponding reference signal. Shown in Fig. 8 are the distributions of the MOS values of each anti-forensic technique used. The mean values of these MOS for SCIF, GSF-NMF and TSSS are 1.733, 2.1995, and 2.1696, respectively. The low MOS values here suggest the presence of (i) a strong difference between the original audio and that processed using the anti-forensic methods, and (ii) musical noise introduced by the anti-forensic methods.
It is important to highlight that the PESQ-based degradation calculated here reveals a degree of distortion between the reference and processed audio recordings. To evaluate distortion due to anti-forensic processing, a small-scale subjective test is also conducted. For this purpose, two graduate students (one male and one female) with normal hearing ability are enrolled to participate in the subjective evaluation. The students are asked to listen to original and processed audio recordings and provide feedback in terms of 'unnoticeable', 'noticeable', 'noticeable but not annoying', and 'annoying'. The average subjective test score for the audio recordings processed using the selected anti-forensic methods indicates that processing distortion for the GSF-NMF and TSSS methods is barely noticeable, whereas the distortion for the SCIF method is noticeable but not annoying. The subjective evaluation reveals that the subjective evaluation score depends on the individual and on the audio recording used. The motivation behind selecting three anti-forensic methods is to evaluate the performance of the proposed method not only on different anti-forensic methods but also on the different distortion levels introduced by the dereverberation methods. Although the audios processed using the selected anti-forensic methods exhibit low PESQ scores, our very small-scale informal subjective test indicates that a low PESQ score does not directly translate into perceptual degradation.
We also believe that the PESQ score for anti-forensic processing can be improved by fine tuning the parameters of the dereverberation algorithms, such as the SCIF algorithm. To achieve this objective, we tune the parameters of SCIF to increase the PESQ score of the processed audio recordings to 2 and test the performance of the proposed algorithm on these processed audio recordings. The average detection performance of the proposed method on the new set of processed audio is summarized in Table III . It can be observed that for some subsets of features, the accuracy decreases slightly. However, the overall accuracy is still in the acceptable range, that is, over 97%. 
D. Anti-Forensic Identification Using the Rich Model
The performance of the proposed rich model-based antiforensic identification is evaluated on both the synthetic and real-world datasets. The performance is evaluated for both the source-matched and source-mismatched cases.
1) Source-Matched Cases for Synthetic Data:
In our third experiment, we evaluate the performance of the proposed anti-forensic identification method for source-matched cases on the synthetic dataset. In this experiment, we assume that the forensic investigator has knowledge of the anti-forensic technique used. This is a reasonable assumption because the long-term surveillance of suspected forgers can be used to predict their attack models. To this end, an SVM-based classifier is trained and tested using the rich-feature set extracted from the datasets generated using the selected dereverberation methods. Moreover, the identification performance is evaluated for individual feature sets, including f LS , f SSD , f PRMS , and f CM , as well as the entire feature set. Table IV, Table V, and  Table VI show the classification accuracies for the individual feature sets and for the entire feature set of the proposed scheme for SCIF, GSF-NMF and TSSS. Here, the result of the entire feature set without dimensionality reduction is omitted due to its low accuracy and high training cost.
The following observations can be made based on the results presented in Tables IV-VI: • Generally, the individual feature sets without dimensionality reduction exhibit the worst performance (except f SSD ).
• In the absence of DR, the feature vector of f SSD is the most effective for detecting the presence of the three dereverberation methods. These results indicate that among all feature sets, spectral shape and distribution features are the most efficient ones in capturing the distortions introduced by the dereverberation methods. • The linear dimensionality reduction method (LPP) significantly improves the classification accuracy for all feature sets except for f SSD .
• The performance with the LPP method significantly fluctuates and its performance is a function of the feature set used and the underlying dereverberation methods used.
• As expected, the classification performance for the nonlinear dimensionality reduction method (Laplacian) outperforms both the original feature set and the LPP method. The accuracy is nearly 100% for the entire feature set.
• For the entire feature set, both the LPP and the Laplacian methods perform quite well, and the Laplacian method is shown to be superior to the LPP method.
• The LPP method degrades the classification accuracy of the feature set f SSD for the SCIF and GSF-NMF methods. The reasons can be explained as follows: -The classification accuracies of the feature sets f SSD for the SCIF and GSF-NMF methods have already exceeded 98%. The use of the DR method may not be able to further improve the accuracy. -The feature vectors may not satisfy the linear assumption used by LPP. Therefore, the LPP method returns non-optimal feature subsets. We re-conduct the experiments on the feature set f SSD using linear discriminant analysis [50] . The accuracies for SCIF and GSF-NMF are 99.27% and 99.67%, respectively. The results indicate that the performance strongly depends on the choice of the linear dimensionality reduction method.
• The DR significantly improved the accuracy, which is a counterintuitive observation. To determine the reason behind this phenomenon, we repeat experiments without using DR hundreds of times. It has been observed that the training accuracies are approximately 100% on average. However, the testing accuracies are similar with the results presented in Table IV , Table V and Table VI (ranging from 55% to 70%). It can also be observed that the DR methods are the most effective for f LS and f PRMS , which have a dimensionality of several hundreds. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the lower testing accuracies might be attributed to the overfitting of the classifier. To further investigate this issue, a machine learning method that is robust to overfitting is utilized to train the model on the original feature sets (without DR) [51] . The experimental results are shown in Table VII . Compared with the previous results, the average improvements in terms of accuracy for f LS , f PRMS and f CM were 22%, 14%, and 21%, respectively. If the DR method (Laplacian) is applied, the classification accuracy reaches 99%, which is consistent with the results presented in Table IV, Table V and Table VI (last  columns) . Consequently, the poor detection performance, in the absence of DR, can be attributed to the overfitting issues. Hence, the gain due to the DR can be achieved by: -Reducing the feature dimension and lowering the risk of overfitting. -Preserving the most important features and the locality properties of features.
• Finally, the nonlinear DR method always outperforms the linear DR approach. Optimal DR selection is not the focus of this paper; therefore, we have not evaluated the performance of the other DR methods. Furthermore, there is no universal optimal DR method for all cases. For the performance evaluation of the following experiments, only the nonlinear (Laplacian) DR method is used.
2) Source-Mismatched Case on Synthetic Data:
In practical applications, the forensic investigator may not have knowledge of the dereverberation techniques adopted by the attacker. It is therefore not reasonable to train the classifier on the same dereverberation method. In our fourth experiment, the performance of the proposed rich model-based anti-forensic identification method is evaluated for a source-mismatched case.
The average classification accuracies of the proposed scheme for the individual feature sets, where the classifier is trained on dereverberation method A and tested on method B ( A, B ∈ {SCIF, GSM-NMF, TSSS}) are summarized in Table VIII (a). It can be observed from Table VIII (a) that the classification accuracy depends on the dereverberation algorithms. The lowest accuracy (85.5%) is obtained when A = SCIF and B = TSSS and for the feature set f LS . Feature set f CM yields the best accuracy (i.e., ∼ 100%), regardless of the dereverberation methods employed. Furthermore, the noise residual feature (f CM ) is the most robust metric among the remaining feature sets for the source-mismatched scenario. The overall accuracy for all of the feature sets is 95.62%, which is equivalent to a performance deterioration of ≈ 5% compared with the source-matched case.
Likewise, shown in Fig. 9 are the plots of ROC curves along with detection accuracies of the proposed scheme for the source-mismatched case with the entire feature set. Here, "A → B" indicates that the classifier is trained on method A and tested on method B. As expected, the accuracy decreases as a result of the source mismatch. The following observations can be made from Fig. 9 :
• The percentage of performance deterioration depends on the dereverberation approaches used.
• There is almost no performance deterioration if the classifier is trained on SCIF (see Figs. 9 (a)& (b) ).
• Training on the GSM-NMF method and testing on the SCIF method yields the largest decrease of ≈ 6%.
• The average accuracy of the source-mismatched case is 96.2%, which indicates that the proposed scheme is also effective for the source-matched scenario. From the experimental results presented in Table VIII (a) and shown in Fig. 9 , the following facts can be observed:
• The feature set (f CM ) extracted from the musical noise residual results in the best accuracy.
• The feature set f CM is robust to the source-mismatched case because only the noise residual is used for feature extraction, which alleviates the interference of the signal content.
• The average classification accuracy for the entire feature set (96.2%) is marginally superior to the best performance for the individual feature set (e.g., 95.6%). 3) Robustness Against Noise Addition: In our fifth experiment, we investigate the robustness of the proposed method against additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) attack. For this purpose, the performance of the proposed method is evaluated in the presence of AWGN noise with various signalto-noise ratio (SNR) values. Shown in Fig. 10 are the detection accuracies of the proposed method for the entire feature set under various SNR values. It can be observed from Fig. 10 that there is no significant accuracy degradation for both the SCIF and GSM-NMF methods in the source-matched case. The variation in accuracy can be attributed to the random selection of the training and testing datasets. Moreover, the performance degrades for the TSSS method for SNR ≤ 15 dB. It can be observed from Fig. 10 that increasing the noise level slightly decreases the detection accuracy. Overall, the proposed method is robust to AWGN attack for SNR > 15 dB.
In our sixth experiment, we evaluate the robustness of the proposed "musical noise" feature f CM under AWGN attack. For this purpose, the performance for f CM is also evaluated Table IX that the selected feature set f CM achieves an extremely high accuracy of ∼ 100% for SNR = 20 dB, and it decreases to 95% for SNR= 15 dB. The performance degradation for stronger noise can be attributed to the fact that the residual noise captures distortions due to the anti-forensic methods and background noise. The presence of strong background noise is expected to degrade the effectiveness of f CM . The detection performance shown in Fig. 10 and Table IX validates this claim.
4) Performance of Real-World Recordings:
In our seventh experiment, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme for real-world recordings. For this experiment, only the source-mismatched case is considered.
Shown in Table VIII (b) are the classification accuracies of the proposed scheme for the individual feature sets with real-world recordings. It can be observed from Table VIII(b) that, for the real-world recordings, the average accuracies for the feature sets of f LS and f CM do not degrade compared with the synthetic dataset. Moreover, marginal performance improvements over the synthetic dataset are observed for the feature sets of f SSD (5% ↑) and f PRMS (3.85% ↑). These improvements can be attributed to the fact that dereverberation processing removes both the reverberation and background noise, which leads to distinct noise levels in the original reverberant signal and anti-forensic signal. The proposed feature set also captures the difference of noise levels. Finally, the experimental results for the synthetic data and real-world recordings show that the feature (f CM ) extracted from the musical noise outperforms the other features and is the most robust for the source-mismatched scenario.
Likewise, shown in Fig. 11 are plots of detection performance in terms of ROC curves of the proposed scheme for the real-world recordings for the entire feature set. As shown in Fig. 11 , for the real-world data, an average accuracy of 97.78% is achieved. This result is comparable to that for the synthetic dataset (see Fig. 9 ). It is reasonable to conclude that the entire feature set does not result in superior performance. The underlying reason is that the DR method does not guarantee that an optimal feature subset is obtained. If any subset (such as f CM ) of the entire feature set results in good performance, increasing the feature dimension does not guarantee further improvement in the classification accuracy. Subsequently, the musical noise feature set, f CM , significantly outperforms the other feature sets and the entire feature set. This is mainly because that the musical noise feature is specifically designed to characterize the musical noise introduced by dereverberation processing.
5) Robustness to Filtering Attacks:
In our final experiment, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method under filtering attacks. We investigate the robustness of the proposed feature sets against median filtering and mean filtering attacks. For this purpose, a real-world dataset is tested on the selected filtering methods (median and mean filtering with window size equals to p). The performance of the proposed method is then evaluated on the resulting two filtered datasets (one for median filtering and another for mean filtering).
Shown in Table X are the classification accuracies for the entire feature set for median filtering with p = 5 samples. It can be observed from Table X that the proposed method is robust against median filtering attack because almost no performance deterioration is observed if comparing to the results presented in Fig. 11 (from 97.78% to 97.58%). Likewise, shown in Table XI are the classification accuracies for the entire feature set for mean filtering attack with p = 5 samples. It can be observed from Table XI that the proposed method is also robust against mean filtering attack because there is no significant performance degradation under mean filtering attack (see Fig. 11 ).
In short, it can be observed from Fig. 11 , Table X and  Table XI that the proposed method is robust against median and mean filtering attacks.
6) Further Discussion on Source-Mismatched Issue:
The performance of the proposed method has been extensively evaluated using different datasets and subjected to a diverse set of attacks. In this section, a considerably more challenging issue, that of classifier training and testing, is briefly discussed. Here, the SVM-based classifier is trained on the synthetic database, and then it is used to classify the real-world speech recordings. Shown in Table XII are the classification accuracies of the proposed entire feature set. It can be observed from Table XII that the performance degrades significantly as a result of the highly mismatched sources.
Moreover, the performance of the proposed musical noise feature set, f CM , is also investigated. Shown in Table XIII are the classification accuracies of the proposed feature set f CM . As shown in Table VIII , the accuracies decrease moderately if the dereverberation methods for training and testing are the same (average decrease is 5.3%). However, if the dereverberation methods for training and testing are different, the average classification accuracy decreases significantly, that is, from 99% to 71.06%. Moreover, the performance of the different dereverberation methods becomes highly unreliable. The accuracy fluctuates from 99.16% to 51.23%. It can also be observed from Tables XII and XIII that f CM yields better performance than the entire feature set. The fact is that the f CM only characterizes the "musical noise", which is less dependent on the speech content.
In general, the performance in this case is less reliable than that in the other cases. This result may be due to the following reasons: 1) some features, such as f LS and f SSD , are speech content-dependent, which results in poor performance in this highly source-mismatched case; 2) the synthetic channel impulse response generated by the image source model [52] does not match the actual channel impulse response in realworld recordings; and 3) the synthetic background noise is also distinct from the real background noise that typically presents in real-world speech. In practice, it is unnecessary to use the synthetic database for training because there are plenty of low-cost portable recorders for capturing sufficient real-world speech for training.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel framework for anti-forensic processing to attack the environmental-signaturebased audio splicing detection method [21] . Three dereverberation methods are considered to illustrate effectiveness of the proposed anti-forensic attack. We also proposed a framework for detecting anti-forensic attacks. To detect the presence of potential anti-forensic processing, both the objective quality evaluation and a machine learning-based technique are used. Specifically, a rich-feature model is used to capture traces anti-forensic processing. The proposed rich-feature model consisting of Fourier coefficients, spectral properties, high-order statistics of "musical noise" residuals, and perceptually relevant features to capture traces of dereverberation processing. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated on synthetic and real-world datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can detect the presence of anti-forensic processing. More specifically, the tests on the individual feature set show that the feature extracted from the "musical noise" residual results in the best performance. Moreover, effectiveness of the proposed method has also been evaluated for source-matched and source-mismatched scenarios. Finally, robustness of the proposed method has also been evaluated for common audio processing attacks, including AWGN, median filtering, and mean filtering.
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